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0 1.Credit Freezes, Equilibrium Multiplicity, and Optimal Bailouts in Financial Networks 作者 Matthew O Jackson Agathe Pernoud 摘要 We analyze how interdependencies in financial networks can lead to self-fulfilling insolvencies and multiple possible equilibrium outcomes. Multiplicity arises if a certain type of dependency cycle exists in the network. We show that finding the cheapest bailout policy that prevents self-fulfilling insolvencies is computationally hard, but that the optimal policy has intuitive features in some typical network structures. Leveraging indirect benefits ensures systemic solvency at a cost that never exceeds half of the overall shortfall. In core-periphery networks, it is optimal to bail out peripheral banks first as opposed to core banks. 我们分析了金融网络中的相互依存关系如何导致自我实现的破产和多种可能的均衡结果。如果网络中存在某种类型的依赖循环,就会出现多重性。我们表明,找到最便
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