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点击上方“蓝字”关注我们 译者 | 鲁安妮 复旦大学 LL.B. 一审 | LYJ NUS LLM 二审 | 郝林桦 西南政法大学本科生 编辑 | 袁驰程 江西师范大学本科生 Loca 中国社会科学院大学硕士 责编 | 扎恩哈尔 新疆农业大学 ★ The Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 59, Number 3 | August 2016 《法与经济学杂志》第59卷第3期 01 1 1 Why Wait to Settle? An Experimental Test of the Asymmetric-Information Hypothesis 为什么迟迟不和解？关于信息不对称假设的实验验证 Sean P. Sullivan The US legal system encourages civil litigants to quickly settle their disputes, yet lengthy and expensive delays often precede private settlements. The causes of these delays are uncertain. This paper describes an economic experiment designed to test one popular hypothesis: that asymmetric information might be a contributing cause of observed settlement delays. Experimental results provide strong evidenc
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